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POTENTIAL USES OF SMALLER SATELLITES
FOR MILITARY SPACE OPERATIONS

2Lt Dennis Montera and ILt Thomas Utsch
Air Force Systems Command Space Division
Office of Deputy for
Plans and Advanced Programs
Los Angeles Air Force Base, California
ABSTRACT

This paper describes potentially attractive uses of smaller
satellites for complementing current Air Force space systems. By
mission area, the applications of smaller satellites as enhancements to current systems are shown for three operational scenarios:
(1) to provide dedicated support to tactical war-fighting
users, (2) to provide a quick-response surge to augment current
systems in a crisis, and (3) in the case of the failure or loss
of a satellite, to provide responsive back-up systems for use
until new primary systems can be deployed. Preliminary results
show that in every space mission area, smaller satellites can
potentially provide a useful enhancement to the current systems.
The enhancements in most cases are improvements in coverage,
capacity, and data timelines which are required from time to time
by certain user segments. Enhancements in some cases simultaneously improve the robustness and resiliency of the space mission
area. The smaller satellites probably cannot realistically
replace current systems, which have evolved to their current
configuration through years of optimization of cost, mission
capability, and survivability. The results show that using
current technolgy and design practices, the 500-1000 pound weight
class of satellite is what is being referred to as smaller, but
useful.
INTRODUCTION

The potential use of smaller satellites for military operations
has become a subject of great interest. Presented here are the
results of work at Air Force Systems Command Space Division to
understand what, if any, potential mission enhancements smaller
satellites may provide. The term "smaller" refers to spacecraft
which are less capable than many of the large steady-state systems we have, but not microsatellites which could use very high
technology to miniaturize subsystems.
A considerable amount of previous work has been done on the
similar topics of responsive launch, reconstitutable space systems, and survivable launch systems [1], [2], [3], [4].
The
past studies primarily focused on communications, missile warning, and weather missions.
Of the numerous potential applications of smaller satellites,
three operational scenarios are being investigated: (1) to
provide dedicated support to tactical war-fighting users, (2) to
provide a quick-response surge to augment the coverage, data
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quality, or data timelines of current systems in a crisis, and
(3) in the case of the failure-or loss of a satellite, to provide
responsive back-up systems for use until new primary systems can
be deployed.
In the first scenario, smaller satellites are used on a steadystate basis to improve support to certain users, in certain
areas, who are not getting what they-.need now but cannot afford
to by their own copy of existing large systems. Often this comes
from their low user priority rating. 'The smaller satellites do
not necessarily need to be responsive.
The second scenario refers to the surge capability provided by
responsive satellites to be quickly deployed to improve service
to certain users in a crisis scenario, e.g. the Falklands conflict, Grenada operation, Desert One operation, etc. The users'
needs in peacetime are supported by current systems. As a crisis
develops, their needs greatly increase, but the current systems
cannot quickly adjust. The surge satellites can best be used in
this mode by optimizing their performance for the user in need
and his area of interest only. After the crisis subsides in a
few months, the user no longer needs this additional support.
The third scenario refers to providing a minimum essential interim capability in the event of loss or attack on a large current
system. Current systems usually take from 3 to 6 months to
launch and check-out on orbit. To re-design them for rapid
launch and check-out is not affordable, but a smaller system that
can be made affordable could have great utility for this mode of
operation. Following is a description, by mission area, of some
potentially interesting uses for smaller satellites and some
preliminary concepts.
Dedicated Steady-state Communications
The current communications architecture, comprised of the Defense
Satellite Communication System (DSCS) , Fleet Satellite Commaunication System (FLTSATCOM), and soon HILSTAR systems, is very
effective in supporting users' needs for inter-theater communications, but lacks the capacity to also support all intra-theater
communications needs of tactical warfighting users (theater
commanders and their tactical forces) . Because war-fighters have
a lower priority for communications usage than strategic, intelligence, and National Command Authority users, they perceive that
they will not have essential communications service available for
their use in time of crisis. Most users have already purchased
terminals, but are unable to use them even in peacetime for
combat exercises scheduled far in advance.
For example, UHF
terminals exceed the available bandwidth capacity by a factor of
10. A review of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-validated conmunications requirements reveals that 60 percent of the unsatisfied,
requirements are for intra-theater voice communication.
Smaller satellites may be able to be efficiently used, to supplement the current communications architecture and fill the intratheater need. In order to make the communications affordable,
the satellites should offer a smaller, but useful, increment of
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communications capacity than our current systems. Sizing this
useful increment of capability is difficult and requires a number
of iterations between the user community and system designers. A
preliminary estimate based on MILSTAR's planned capability in a
very stressed environment shows that roughly 36 voice channels
are a potentially useful capability.
Since continuous coverage is mandatory for the war-fighting users
involved in a crisis, geostationary orbits seem to fit this concept best. This allows one satellite to cover an entire theater,
thereby reducing complexity for the satellite controller. Other
deployment strategies also offer full coverage, but more satellites are required. For example, three satellites in three
planes are required for continous theater coverage using semisynchronous elliptical high inclination orbits. The lowest cost
constellation will be eventually decided by launch vehicle capability and cost.
To reduce total cost to the user, a dedicated communications
satellite should be compatible with the user's existing or
planned terminals, i.e. if the user has an SHF terminal, the
satellite should "look" like a DSCS.
To reinforce the theater commander's perception of ownership of
the satellite, command and control will not be done in the conventional way. Spacecraft housekeeping (ephemeris uplinking,
telemetry read-out) could be performed by AFSPACECOM, but the
payload (e.g. antenna, spot beam location) controlled by the
theater commander. The theater commander should have total authority to allocate his communications capacity as he sees fit.
Survivability (both against jamming and ASAT attack) is a key
driver of cost and size of the current communications systems.
Since dedicated satellites would not be relied upon for intertheater communications, the system survivability could be tailored to meet the threat of tactical scenarios. Threats in
tactical scenarios are usually much smaller than in strategic
scanarios; hence if affordability is a major goal for theater
user-dedicated satellites, it may make sense to tailor survivability measures.
Finally, since tactical forces need to practice and become comfortable with a resource in peacetime before they will rely on it
in battle, a user-dedicated communications satellite must operate
as a steady-state resource. This could help to alleviate peacetime needs also. The satellite should be equipped with appropriate redundant back-up systems to ensure it has long lifetime.
Keeping this baseline concept of what could constitute an affordable and useful tactical-user-dedicated communications satellite
in mind, concepts which operate at SHF and EHF frequencies were
developed. These concepts may not be optimized in performance or
size, but they are models for first-order feasability analysis.
The payload concept at SHF is basically a down-sized DSCS III. A
satellite can be built around the two 40 watt transponders of a
DSCS III and provide two-thirds the power of a DSCS III with only
one-third the bandwidth. A schematic of this payload concept is
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shown in Figure 1. The payload is ideal for tactical applications since smaller tactical terminals require more satellite
power than the larger strategic and wideband communications
terminals for which DSCS was designed. This smaller satellite
could dedicate more power to each user terminal and provide
better service to the tactical user. It is still capable of
servicing the wideband users of the SHF spectrum such as the
Ground Mobile Forces. Reducing a DSCS to this smaller version
would still supply multiple increments of the communications
capability determined to be potentially useful to theater commanders (36 voice channels) .
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A payload concept at EHF is the FLTSATCOM EHF Package (FEP) ,
which is a small secondary payload on some FLTSATCOM satellites.
Figure 2 is a layout of the FEP package. The FEP could be the
payload on a smaller satellite and meet the required useful
increment of intra-theater communications capacity, while providing the anti-jam performance of MILSTAR due to the exotic waveform and EHF spectrum used. This concept would only support
narrowband users.
Another concept at EHF is to remove the MILSTAR signal processing
equipment from the satellite and instead place it in a mobile
ground processing station. The satellite would be a dual relay
package. A station would transmit its signal to the satellite
which would then downlink the information to the processing
station. There the information would be processed and uplinked
back to the satellite which would relay the information to the
intended receive station of the transmission. To the operator,
he still thinks he is talking to a MILSTAR-like satellite.
Responsive Communications Surge
The smaller tactical user-dedicated communications satellite
concept previously discussed was designed for theater users who
require that the system supporting them is available during noncrisis periods for routine use and training. But needs for
communication systems which can be deployed responsively to
support particular users in particular areas of interest also
exist. Special operations forces, conducting training and exercises somewhere in the continental United States, could be able
to obtain communications satellite links on theater-dedicated
satellites (just described) to support their training. Hence
they would have the chance to become familiar with the coranraiieations system during training. Consequently, they would rely on
the satellites during a real mission. Should these units quickly
deploy to support a developing crisis, they would need responsively deployed communications satellites, with links identical
to the ones used for training, to support the units in the
of interest. This holds true for any quick reaction
scenario.
Weather Sensing
Several potential uses of smaller satellites to support the
weather mission exist. Cloud imagery is by far the most important data received by both strategic and tactical Defense Meteor-
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ological Satellite System (DMSS) users. Cloud image data is the
only information transmitted directly from the satellites to the
tactical earth terminals (ship-board and Mark IVa). The terminals also can receive the cloud imagery downlink data from the
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
polar orbiting weather satellites. Many tactical users carry
small terminals which receive foreign weather satellite signals.
During unstressed periods, the DMSS refresh rate (of six hours)
may be acceptable to tactical users, but during a crisis, the
users involved need much more rapid weather updates. To provide
this refresh rate on a continuous basis to all parts of the world
with DMSP is not realistic or affordable; but for limited periods of time (during conflicts), users in the area of conflict
highly value timely cloud imagery. A small satellite, containing
only the cloud imaging payload that can be responsively launched
and flown in an orbit which optimizes coverage over the crisis
area of interest could have utility.
One deployment concept would use two satellites, flown 180 degrees out of phase, in 8 hour period orbits, in one orbit plane
inclined at 90 degrees. This constellation provides continuous
coverage to all of the northern hemisphere above 34 degrees
latitude, if the orbit apogees are positioned over the northern
pole. This coverage pattern is stable for about 30 days, after
which time the oblateness of the earth causes the line of apsides
to rotate, degrading coverage to the region. Two 1000 Ib satellites can be launched on a single Delta 6925 booster into this
orbit.
Payload options for the cloud imaging satellite include the
Optical Linescan System (OLS), which is the primary imagery
sensor on DMSP, and the Advanced Very High Radiation Radiometer
(AVHRR), which is the primary sensor on NOAA. The total weight
of a spacecraft carrying the OLS is in the neighborhood of 7001000 Ib, and in 350-600 Ib range for the AVHRR (spacecraft weight
can be decreased if higher technology and minimal redundancy are
used).
Another use of the same small cloud imaging satellite is as a
responsive back-up capability for failed or attacked DMSP satellites which could be used until a new DMSP is deployed. The
smaller satellite, in this case, would be deployed in the same
sun-synchronous orbit as the failed DMSP, with the same ascending
node phasing.
Oceanographic Sensing
The AVHRR also provides three infrared spectral bands which users
of the OLS do not receive. Taken together, the IR bands allow
one to see the sea surface temperature profiles off of the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. The 3.8 micron band of the AVHRR allows
detection of all surface ships because the exhaust steam particles interact with the atmosphere at this wavelength and can be
seen as streaks behind ships [5]. Tactical users sometimes rely
on AVHRR imagery, but NOAA satellites have an un-encrypted downlink,'so the Soviets use the information too. In time of crisis,
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NOAA may have to be turned off to deny this information to the
Soviets; hence a responsive smaller satellite carrying the AVHRR
with an encrypted downlink may be needed to replace this capability in such a scenario.
Space Environmental Monitoring
Ionospheric warning and space environmental monitoring is another
mission area where small satellites potentially can improve user
support from space. Many HF,VHF , and low-frequency UHF terrestrial communicators increase their communication range by bouncing signals off of the ionosphere. A need exists to be able to
accurately predict ionospheric disturbances which arise from
solar flares and disrupt communications. A smaller satellite
carrying a space environmental monitoring instrumentation payload
flown in a circular polar orbit can provide greatly improved
space environmental data. The optimal altitude for in-situ measurements is 300 km (DMSS altitude is 833 km) . The payload could
be similar to the 200 Ib payload on the NOAA satellite could be
flown on a small satellite weighing less than 1000 Ib.
Tactical Targeting
Tactical users need to get more timely information of the regions
far beyond their battle line, or so-called FLOT (Forward Line of
Troops). Responsive launch of smaller satellites into orbits
which focus coverage on a crisis area of interest could have
potential for supporting this need.
To achieve high resolution imagery, satellites need to be flown
in very low orbits (300 km and below) . An infrared sensor which
provided 1 meter resolution during the day and in clear weather
would reguire a 2000 Ib total weight spacecraft. Resolution
directly affects weight because it mandates the size of sensor
optics. Relaxing the resolution by a factor of 2 to 2 meters,
would result in an approximately 1200 Ib spacecraft. Another
option is a synthetic aperture radar payload.
Infrared Backgrounds and Mapping Surveillance
The capability to provide a timely infrared map of a given area
of interest, showing how the infrared background radiation compares to target infrared radiation levels, is needed to support
IR guided munitions (heat seeking) deployment. A satellite with
an infrared mapping payload which could be responsively launched
to support a given area of interest could be useful. Depending
on the resolution required, a down-sized version of the Landsat
sensor payload (weight of 500 Ib, 10 meter resolution in 7 IR
spectral bands) could be flown on a satellite with total weight
well under 1000 Ib. Good coverage requires that a highinclination, relatively low altitude circular orbit be used.
Wide Area Surveillance
Smaller infrared sensing satellites show potential for augmenting
a space-based radar wide area surveillance and tracking system
either to provide a steady-state support or support for short -
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duration crises. Being a passive surveillance system, infrared
can be used to provide steady-state surveillance while not alerting the adversary and can cue the pulsing of the active radar
system to provide the very exact target information needed just
prior to strike. Radar consumes large amounts of power, allowing
continuous operation for only a few hours at a time. Continuous
radar surveillance also gives away the location of the radar
emitter, increasing the threat of ASAT attack. A major limitation of infrared is its inability to penetrate clouds, but infrared phenomenology can complement radar signature phenomenology to
allow more precise detection and identification of objects.^
Deployment of the infrared satellites would have to be in highinclination circular orbits near the radar platforms. Depending
on the resolution required (10 meter resolution should be sufficient to identify large bombers and ships), the smaller infrared
satellite could, be kept under 1000 Ib total weight.
A smaller satellite could be used either as a space-based blstatic radar emmitter which flies over an area of interest,
illuminating the region so receivers on the ground can detect
objects in the sky or it can be used as a receiver to a large
space-based radar illuminator by flying over the region of interest at much lower altitude than'the emitter, reducing the emitter
power required, since the reflected signal does not travel as
far.
ga.feellite_Control Network Augmentation
A small communications relay satellite could be' used to replace
lost connectivity in a Satellite Control Network which results
from, loss of an overseas remote tracking station (RTS). By
deploying the smaller satellite in. a low altitude orbit, a simple
SGLS-to-SGLS relay payloads could store telemetry data downlinked
from a stranded, satellite and then, downlink the stranded satellite. f s telemetry data to another RTS. Commands from the ground
way. The weight of such a satelcould be uplinked in the.
lite would be on the order of 500-800 Ib. Alternatively,: a more,
heavier SGLS-to-DSCS transponder could be used on the
complex
small relay satellite and transmit the stranded satellite/'s
telemetry and uplinked command data in real time.

Navigation
A smaller satellite carrying a navigation (GPS) payload could be
to augment the coverage, and. availability of navigation
satellites over an. area of interest in the. event that part of the
is a very
destroyed by ASAT attack.
constellation
robust, gracefully degrading constellation which, has on-orbit
sparing* Useful navigation capability is achieved, with as few as
constellation operating. But over a period of time,
half of
constellation using a co-orbital
down
to
it is.
ASAT, In this event, smaller navigation, satellites could
improve navibe flown in high, inclination elliptical orbits
of interest*
gation

Space Surveillance

... . , . .

Smaller ''responsive satellites carrying visible-light sensor
payloads (total satellite weight of 1000 pounds} could be used to
augment our currently ground-based space surveillance system,
improving -satellite attack warning for valuable geosynchronous
satellites. Depending on the warning 'time required, one. or two
visible light payloads flown in elliptical, 16 hour period,
equatorial orbits are sufficient. They do not have to be deployed as a continuous augmentation of the space- surveillance
system but can be deployed prior to escalation of a potential
world or theater conflict. They could also be used to increase ...
our space surveillance coverage in the southern hemisphere to
detect deployment of payloads from the Soviet space shuttle.

High resolution imagery of spacecraft could be acquired using a
1000 pound satellite deployed in an orbit which intersects the
orbits of unknown satellites. Resolution of 4 inches at 40. km,
which is sufficient resolution to discern the general function of
an unkown satellite can be obtained in this satellite weight
range.
CONCLUSION
Smaller satellites have potential uses in almost every space
mission area as a means for complementing current systems to
provide dedicated continuous support to theater tactical users,
to provide quick response capabilities which support users in a
crisis, and to provide a responsive interim back-up capability
for lost systems.
The 1000 Ib class of satellites, using conventional technology
and design practices for redundancy, seems to be the general
limit on size of smaller satellites which still perform useful
military missions.
Future work at the Plans and Advanced Programs Office of Air
Force Systems Command Space Division will focus on refining and
understanding the needs and uses of smaller satellites and developing conceptual designs of smaller satellite systems which
are compatible with current user terminals and practices.
It is hoped that mission application studies such as this will be
considered when goals for smaller satellite technology development programs, such as the DARPA ASTP, are established.
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